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#### The idea that security cooperation can exist is a fallacy- we are in a war now, and the university is both a birth place and site of war- debate is one of those warzones, where we militarize against black and indigenous bodies.

Howell 18, (Howell, Allison (2018). Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117–136. doi:10.1080/14616742.2018.1447310) GP

Just as “militarization” has guided inquiry into contemporary police violence, it has also been used to call attention to worrying connections between the university and the US national security apparatus. One prominent example is the series of Vice News reports exposing the “100 Most Militarized Universities in America” (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a, 2015b). The authors of the study note that initially they were reluctant to use the term “militarization,” which was not meant to simply evoke … ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] drills held on a campus quad. It was also a measure of university labs funded by US intelligence agencies, administrators with strong ties to those same agencies, and, most importantly, the educational backgrounds of the approximately 1.4 million people who hold Top Secret clearance. (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a) But “militarization” leads us to underestimate the depth and extent of national security ties to the university, past and present, and to assume that universities can revert to some non-militarized past. This limitation is also evident in scholarly literature. One of the central scholarly texts on the so-called “militarization” of the university is Giroux’s The University in Chains (2007). Cited hundreds of times, and reported on in popular media, it argues that the post-9/11 period saw a significant acceleration of the corporatization and militarization of the university (Giroux 2007, 2008). Giroux goes so far as to say that while corporatization had previously taken root in the university, “it is only in the aftermath of 9/11 that the university has also become an intense site of militarization” (Giroux 2008, 58). Furthermore, “militarization” of the university begins for Giroux only after World War II (see also Chomsky et al. 1998). These popular and scholarly works identify important changes in the nature of military involvement in universities. For example, the Vice report notes that funding now flows to intelligence-gathering disciplines (e.g., computer science) rather than solely weapons-oriented ones (e.g., physics). Yet research guided by the concept of “militarization” falls into the trap of imagining military encroachment on previously civil institutions: “the idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research appears to have been usurped” (Giroux 2008, 63). This is a fantasy. The university was never such a pure site. Many American universities were built with slave labor or its proceeds (Brown University Committee on Slavery and Justice n.d.), and from the outset have contributed vitally to colonization and White supremacy. By positing a purely civilian “before” to a military “after,” “militarization” accounts wrongfully elide this history. In the American university no such “before” exists. This is not to say nothing has changed. Seeing the university as a site of “martial politics” allows us to provide a historical account attuned to the ways in which politics is shaped by the precise forms warfare takes. Most academic disciplines – the very categories by which we organize knowledge – were fundamentally shaped by conquest, warfare and military funding. This is not only true for IR, a discipline born out of colonialism and war (Vitalis 10 A. HOWELL 2015), but for any number of other disciplines from physics (Gusterson 1998, 2011) to business (Cowen 2014) to neuroscience (Howell 2017). Excavating these histories gives us a sense of how thoroughly we live with “martial politics.” Several disciplines were said to have been “militarized” after 9/11. Most controversially, medicine, psychiatry, psychology and anthropology all had major debates about involvement in torture and warfare in their professional associations. In anthropology, for example, this debate concerned the 2008 establishment of Project Minerva (which provided $50 million in defense funding to social sciences) and the recruitment of anthropologists in counterinsurgency warfare through the Human Terrain Program (Gusterson 2009). To describe this as the “militarization” of anthropology, however, is to ignore that anthropology is foundationally a colonial discipline set up to catalog “primitive” subject peoples, with a long history of entanglement with the security state, not least in Cold War-era counterinsurgency operations in Latin America and Asia (Gusterson 2009). The concept of “martial politics” allows us to pose new questions about the historical relationship between formal knowledge production and forms of warfare, rather than just relations between the university and the military. It allows us to ask how certain forms of warfare are produced by, and produce, academic disciplines. The nature of this mutual production will differ depending on the particular military strategy undertaken at any historical moment. The case of psychology is instructive here. After psychologists were implicated in devising, administering and overseeing torture at the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay (Howell 2007), concern was raised about the “militarization” of psychology (Ariggo, Eidelson, and Bennett 2012). Again, this concern assumes that the discipline was once free from involvement in war or colonialism, and that an unusual trespass occurred after 9/11. Not so. Since almost its very foundation, psychology has been tied to forms of military strategy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychology was a fledgling discipline and was understood as a humanistic form of knowledge. That changed drastically in World War I. At that time Robert Yerkes, a eugenics proponent and professor of psychology, was President of the American Psychological Association. Convinced that psychologists could be of service in the war, and that war could be useful to psychologists, Yerkes approached the US Army with a proposition: he could help the Army with its personnel problem (of appropriately placing the massive number of new recruits) in return for funding and access to an unprecedented number of subjects on which to experiment: soldiers. World War I enabled the first mass scientific experiment in psychology in the form of intelligence testing. The data accumulated provided fodder for a generation of psychologists, establishing the experiment as the primary methodology of psychology and massively INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS 11 reshaping the discipline from a philosophical/humanistic one into an (American) science. This constitutes a symbiotic relationship: psychology was not “militarized” in World War I. Rather, it propelled a particular kind of warfare: industrial warfare conducted on frontlines, involving mass mobilization and requiring new personnel management techniques. Wartime support, in return, worked to reshape psychology into a science. The academy is not the victim of military breach but has foundationally been produced and formed, in its specificities, through warfare – and has formed warfare in return as a technology of security (Howell 2011). Psychology was already well steeped in the racist and ableist science of eugenics prior to World War I (Mitchell and Snyder 2003; Carey 2009; Thomson 2010), but through military funding it was able to systematize its eugenicism as a science of “intelligence.” This martial entanglement did not end with the war and the return of psychology to “domestic” applications. Intelligence data not only established psychology as a science but went on to practical applications in war-like relations of disability and race both within the

US and other colonial settings. Three examples follow that demonstrate this move. First, the data from the Army experiment produced results that “proved” that the average American had the intelligence level of a 13-year-old, just above the level of “moron” (an ableist construct). This contributed to a moral panic about the degeneration of the “stock” of the American nation due to Southern European immigrants, and led to some of the first sweeping US immigration restrictions. It also bolstered mental hygiene and eugenics movements, promoting the sterilization of disabled, racialized, Indigenous or “promiscuous” women who were labeled feeble-minded (Carey 2003). This form of martial politics perpetrates violence especially on women’s bodies, managing their sexuality and reproductive capacities for the purposes of extirpating “dangerous” or degenerate populations. Second, since they were constructed by White men who saw “intelligence” in their own image, the Army tests unsurprisingly placed the “negro” at the bottom of a racist (and sexist) hierarchy of intelligence (Mensh and Mensh 1991; Gould 1999). With their sheen of objective science, these very same Army tests were administered in South Africa and other colonies, justifying colonial rule and later Apartheid. Finally, Carl Brigham, who was part of the Army experiment team, and later a Princeton University professor and member of the advisory council of the American Eugenics Society, went on to create the high school Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs). The SATs remain the cornerstone of one of the most pernicious and racist aspects of the Army tests’ afterlife: standardized testing. This regime, to this day, outrageously ranks African American students as having 12 A. HOWELL lower intelligence, or aptitude, significantly reducing access to higher education and thus economic mobility. All this history, all these contributions of the discipline of psychology to unjust dynamics surrounding race, disability, poverty and gender, are shuttered by a “militarization” framework because it assumes that when psychology is used in war (e.g., in torture) that this is an aberration rather than part of a broad history of violence done to marginalized people, citizens and enemies alike. In thinking through the “martial politics” of the university, any number of disciplines could be subjected to this kind of analysis. Returning to Maneuvers, consider the case of nursing, to which Enloe (2000) directs her attention in assessing the “militarization” of women’s lives. The chapter in question perceptively begins with Florence Nightingale, who is widely considered to be the “mother” of nursing, a pioneer in statistical visualization and a major figure in the reform of public health and medical care in both the Crimean War and Victorian workhouses. Yet Nightingale sits uneasily in a framework that inquires into the “militarization” of women’s lives because, as Enloe (2000, 204) shows, as a patriotic upper-class White English woman, she herself was active in propelling “militarization.” Because of its “militarization” framework, Enloe’s account misses the fact that warfare and nursing were both modernized and professionalized through their mutual encounter. Nightingale’s innovations transformed siege warfare, helping ensure British victory in the Crimea, and laid the foundations for World War I industrial warfare. After Nightingale returned from the war she was instrumental in creating nursing as a profession and discipline of study, using techniques developed for military purposes in “domestic” settings such as workhouses. The story here is not one of military encroachment on nursing; rather, nursing became a discipline and profession initially through war, and subsequently through war-like relations with the poor. This symbiosis between war and academic disciplines such as nursing, psychology and – for that matter – IR should make it unsurprising when war-like relations are propelled through knowledge created in these disciplines. When we view academic disciplines, or indeed the university as a whole, through the lens of “martial politics” it becomes clear they are not innocent domains sullied by military values. Rather, like the can of soup, their form and function are embedded in how they emerge out of and simultaneously shape warfare. Even when “militarization” accounts are historical, they lead us to misconstrue the importance and nature of that history. When there is violence in domestic political life – whether the outright violence of killer cops or the structural violence of the SATs – it is not that “war” is encroaching on “peace,” and it is not that “the military” is trespassing on the “civilian.” Rather, “martial politics” are fundamental to the constitution and continued production of liberal democracies such as the US. This is not equally at all parts of the population but targets those who are constituted as a threat to the nation’s strength or civil order.

#### Our affective relationality drives us towards war- a drive that creates an inevitability of violence.

Grove 19, (Jairus Grove, Savage Ecology, 2019, Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa)

War as defined by classical war studies suggests a distinct class of actors, interests, aims, and expertise. As a result, the study of war as well as much of the social mobilization of war presumes an exteriority of war and warfare from other sectors and institutions like the economy or the state. For those who study military history, war—in this limited understanding—can certainly be decisive in the rise and fall of nation-states and even transformations of the global system when that system is only indexed by the states that populate it, but the pursuit of these histories still presumes a kind of exceptional character of war. War following this line of thought is a cataclysmic event that interrupts 2. war as a form of life 60—Chapter 2 the otherwise normal character of daily life. For others, particularly in the field of strategic studies, warfare is a tool, an instrument whereby states and sometimes organizations pursue ends beyond the limits of politics and persuasion. War compels and determines a course of action as an orchestral direction of overwhelming force. For those who hope to abolish war, a parallel exteriority animates their theorizing about war. War, according to these thinkers, is reducible to the self-interest of hegemonic states, the militarism of soldiers, and the self-amplifying loop of profit and power. Presidents, generals, ceos, arms dealers, and patriots come together to pursue war as an end in itself. Again, those actors and those pursuits are treated as outside the normal realm of human social relations. But what if war is history? What if the very form of life that created, was reinforced by, mutated with, and emerged from the Eurocene is warlike? State-making, territorialization, expansion, annihilation, settlement, and globalization are all warlike relations. I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of making a form of life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy or discipline. By normal, I mean the very fabric of relations that makes a form of life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage, a war ecology. I am not suggesting that war is the only form of life. There are surviving forms of life interior and exterior to the Eurocene. No process of annihilation succeeds without leaving at least a trace.3 However, the normal workings of daily global life are a state of war. Rather than think of state of war in the juridical or theoretical sense, which distinguish war from peace on the grounds of declarations or measures of order, I want to consider war as an ecology endemic to the Eurocene. So by state of war I mean state in the sense that physicists or chemists think about states of matter. Every state of matter is an order, and despite that order, every state of matter has some elements of other states. A state of matter exhibits properties like solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, or the full-on freak-out of plasma but is not entirely made up of that state. And yet the state still has an effect despite that heterogeneity. So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state of war, is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what it is right now, not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become. Instead, the practices and organizations—from resource extraction, enclosure, carbon liberation, racialization, mass incarceration, border enforcement, policing and security practices, primitive accumulation by dispossession, targeted strikes, to all out combat—are relations of war rather than merely correlates or opportunities War as a Form of Life—61 for a war metaphor. To put it a bit more bluntly, politics, colonialism, settlement, capitalism, ecological destruction, racism, and misogynies are not wars by other means—they are war. War is not a metaphor; it is an intensive fabric of relations making the Eurocene. To make this claim requires rethinking—somewhat bombastically—the meaning of war. If war has such a wide application, it would seem to mean nothing. In talks, roundtables, and casual conversations, colleagues have often suggested that such an expansive definition of war is polemical or even absurd. Others have said that spreading war so thin cheapens the sacrifices and tragedies of those who have experienced “real war.” It is curious to me that many of the same people have no difficulty assigning similar base or structuring characteristics to capitalism, settlement, or patriarchy. I do not see war as a replacement or a displacement of those structuring structures. Instead, war is like those other complicated, heterogeneous, abstract machines but interrelated and importantly semiautonomous in the making of the world.

#### NATO is a mechanism of colonial war- we use it in a war for biopolitical hegemony, making any non-NATO country a guest in their own territories, existing only because of an impossible desire for dominance and control- the most prevalent violence today is not the bombings themselves, but instead the assignment of life v. death.

**Bousquet 09,** (Antoine Bousquet is reader in international relations at Birkbeck, University of London. He is author of The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity, 2009)

It is here that we can see the sovereignty of the host in the brash chauvinism that often calls itself humanitarian intervention. What is often championed as a politically desirable act in the abstract within the current debates over the obligation or traditions of cosmopolitan thinking rarely returns to how one would address those in need or how to go about determining the kind of help desired. The idea that those who intervene are 'guests' in the country they are intervening in is not a significant part of these discussions. The common example used by advocates of humanitarian intervention to dismiss considerations of consent is to compare such actions to those of putting out a fire in a neighbor's house. The simplicity of this metaphor, in its attempt to assert itself as irrefutable common sense, requires interrogation. The example of NATO's involvement in Kosovo is instructive on this point. The decision to use aerial bombing rather than to provide ground support, or to work in tandem with groups already resisting on the ground—which would both risk casualties and political embarrassment—is more like seeing you neighbors front porch on fire and bulldozing the rest of the house so that the fire does not spread to their storage shed or from the shed to your own house. Slavoj Zizek argues that the NATO actions in Kosovo suffered from a combination of the Powell doctrines desire for bloodless (American Blood) and visually decisive actions. Zizek calls this humanized militarism; no one wants to choose sides or politically commit as a result of the devastation that ensues in the failure to have a war without war. He characterizes this by the extensive use of air power and other means, which put Americans out of harms way. Such a strategy, of course, is not responsive to the needs of those who are supposedly being helped. Precision bombing is a little like chainsaw surgery. Even in its most successful renditions the damage to infrastructure and the death of noncombatants—particularly in urban areas in which the 'enemy' and the 'friend' ultimately live in the same space—demonstrates that the ethical commitment expresses a hierarchy of commitments. First commitment, U.S. strategic interest, derived from that goal, the safety of U.S. troops whose loss compromises U.S. war fighting capabilities as a result of declining public support. Second, an overarching commitment to strategic interest and support or tolerance of great power allies. How will Russia respond? Will this signal a shift in U.S. policy towards minority groups and anger China? By the time the interest of those in Kosovo is considered, their 'ethical' weight has decreased significantly in the open market of interests that and policy choices. These choices emerge through relays between the right of the host and its sovereign authority to determine the fate of

Kosovars. The U.S. ability to assert itself as the sovereign of sovereigns is apparent in these decisions. Foucault's notion of biopower, the sovereign right to give life and take life away, appears starkly in William Jefferson Clinton's execution of the intervention.322 "We" are the master of our domain and our domain is determined by our right to decide. Since we reserve and exercise that right irrespective of borders or national origin, our domain—as indexed by acts of sovereign violence whether covert or overt—is global. The sovereign decision to act in Kosovo through NATO as proxy parallels the decision for in action in Rwanda. One exercises the sovereign violence of the United States to act, to save Kosovo, the other confirms the United States sovereign power to let the Tutsis of Rwanda die. The fact the United State through its position in the Security Council not only blocked the involvement of other nations but refused to jam Hutu radio broadcast expresses a preemptory sovereign right. We not only determine who shall be killed, but who will be saved, as in the unimpeded slaughter of Rwandan Tutsis. The distinction between acts of commission and omission evaporates in this rendering of sovereignty. Or rather there is no such thing as 'omission' in a world in which the United States asserts the role of the sovereign of sovereigns. The glimmer of hope in U.S. power is that the United States should be held accountable not only for what it has done, war crimes in Faluja, but everything it hasn't done, the genocides in Sudan and Rwanda. What makes this impossible is the absence or weakness of a site from which one could muster the authority to prosecute the United States. After all, such an act would be itself an incredible act of sovereign authority. The question addressed by Agamben, and more productively by Derrida, is how to do this without the banal return to classic power politics i.e. the replacement of one super-sovereign state, the United States, with another sovereign state or collection of states, like the European Union. Derrida poses the possibility that the International Criminal Court and other pressures towards global governance could provide such an avenue. Rather than abandon sovereign violence, as Agamben seems to attempt without much luck, Derrida proposes the collectivization of Sovereignty to turn its contradiction—U.S. global power based on a global consent that it does not posses—against itself. While I find such a possibility promising, hospitality and Cosmopolitanism cannot serve as the basis for the 'collectivization' of sovereign right. Hospitality as this section makes clear contains the disavowed assumption of the hose. The European locations requires that all who respond to the invitation of the host, Europe, be forever guests in their own world, further reinforcing the violent and inadequate relation between postcolonial nations and their former colonizers.

#### The way in which our war planning is logically structured is created by the emerging technologies professed in the resolution- the scientific method is the method by which we attempt to plan and sanitize war into the knowable, and research into these areas gives us a false paradigm of mastery.

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How has war, an activity traditionally dominated by institutions extolling the virtues of hierarchical command and submission to orders, come to be understood essentially in terms of decentralised networks of combatants connected together by horizontal information links? The most popular account of this momentous transformation usually centres on the availability of a new cornucopia of information and communication technologies that has radically altered the possibilities of human interaction and social organisation. It is a seductive tale combining both simplicity and apparent explanatory power, and indeed widespread applications of such technology can be readily identified. Yet technology is first and foremost a tool and one that only takes on meaning and purpose within the specific social and cultural formations in which it is deployed. Nor does it appear ex nihilo but as the product of a particular human engagement with the world. As Martin van Creveld has observed, "behind military hardware there is hardware in general, and behind that there is technology as a certain kind of know-how, as a way of looking at the world and coping with its problems." 3 In the present age, it is science that provides the dominant way of looking at the world whether as a methodological disposition to problem-solving or in informing our conceptions of how the world works. Our present understanding of the social world in terms of information and networks is directly reflected in the central preoccupations of contemporary science. Indeed the genealogy of the concepts of swarming and self-synchronisation dear to network-centric warfare can be traced back to the scientific theories of chaos and complexity which 2 Transformation Warfare '07, Virginia Beach, VA Convention Center, June 2007. 3 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B. C. to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1 989), p. 1. 2 INTRODUCTION have emerged over the past few decades. Where technology has played a tole, it is in conjunction with the scientific conceptual frameworks that have accompanied its development and diffusion. From the very introduction of the term of network-centric warfare in 1 998, military doctrine and scientific theory were being explicitly linked: "military operations are enormously complex, and complexity theory tells us that such enterprises organise best from the bottom-up."4 Nor is this a novel phenomenon. Scientific concepts and theoretical frameworks have been influencing military thought and practice since the inception of the Scientific Revolution in the late sixteenth century. Moreover the interface between science and warfare has been far from restricted to one-way traffic, with military imperatives stimulating both technological and scientific discoveries. From the earliest synergies between the study of the motion of bodies and military ballistics, science and the military arts have been inextricably bound, long before the scientific breakthrough of the Manhattan project yielded the atomic weapon. This book forms an enquiry into this profound interrelationship of science and warfare. Its central claim is that throughout the modern era the dominant corpus of scientific ideas has been reflected in the contemporary theories and practices of warfare in the Western world. From the ascendancy of the scientific worldview in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the present day, an ever more intimate symbiosis between science and warfare has established itself, with the increasing reliance on the development and integration of technology within complex social assemblages of war. This extensive deployment of scientific ideas and methodologies in the military realm allows us to speak of the constitution and perpetuation of a scientific way of warfare. The notion of a scientific way of warfare seeks not merely to capture the growing role played by science in developing and perfecting military technologies, important as it has been. Rather the primary concern here is with the manner in which scientific ideas have been systematically recruited to inform thinking about the very nature of combat and the forms of military organisation best suited to prevail in it.

#### Thus our only choice in an era of war is to become war- to enter a state of becoming in which we constantly mobilize- a historical analysis of the world through radical empiricism teaches us to enter becoming, instead of being, and no longer are we devoured by war.

Bousquet et al 20 (Antoine Bousquet, Jairus Grove, Nisha Shah, “Becoming War: Towards a Martial Empiricism”,2020) GP

Martial empiricism apprehends war as a process of becoming that is suspended between potentiality and actuality, scrutinizing the enfolding of intensities, relations and attributes that give rise to war’s givenness. War’s ontogenetic powers see it persist across multiple histories and geographies while simultaneously always being recast.4 Although a processualist philosophy expects the sum of reality to be engaged in such becoming, war’s peculiar qualities undoubtedly express becoming’s wildest and most disruptive tendencies. In its various iterations, war’s irruptive possibility has unleashed the most intensive periods of invention and transformation, tearing through carefully erected human orders, shattering sacred idols and shredding cultural pretensions. War reminds us how little control we really have, how easy it is to be swallowed whole and forgotten in an instant. War forces a confrontation with how precarious, finite and insignificant each of us is as a solitary, fleeting line of becoming. Through martial empiricism, we choose fidelity to the world and our encounter with it over fidelity to a method or the comforting illusion that the world is reliably mechanical, discretely rational and providentially progressive. Martial empiricism is an empiricism built to embrace the generative, mutating and world-ending character of war. It belongs to what the anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2014: 105) calls ‘untamed thought’, in which ‘knowing is no longer a way of representing the unknown but of interacting with it’.5 A radical empiricism affirms the world as it is, not as we wish it were. This is the empiricism that war demands – an empiricism that is open-ended and robust enough to bear both the generative chaos of battle and the ever-extending tendrils of its other-than-combat activities. 104 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) Rather than attempting to narrowly circumscribe it in service of prior positivist or normative commitments, martial empiricism permits war to define itself. Contra attempts to compartmentalize reality with unyielding definitions of the object of study, we expect such definitions to become ever less useful as they become more specific. The more assured we are that we know what war is, that we know in advance what to measure, that those units of measurement are isomorphic with each other, the more it will slip between our fingers. The more confident we are in what to look for, the less we are capable of experiencing. There is no better example of this than the insistence by Steven Pinker (2011) or Joshua Goldstein (2012) that war is coming to an end as they brandish spreadsheets that purport to show the statistical decline of armed conflict. Yet what sense is there in conducting a large-n study when every war is its own n? To our mind, what is waning is less the occurrence of war than the capacity of ‘war accountants’ to encounter the world. The normative injunction to only study war through the frame of a problem that has as its unique solution peace is no less limiting. How can such a commitment not obscure what can be known of war? While we are interested in becomings other than war, we do not think we should conduct research in a padded room. The provocation of war’s creativity – its more-than-human persistence, its continuities and discontinuities – demands theorizing even if those lines of thought do not have happy endings. In our formulation of martial empiricism, we draw inspiration from the ‘radical empiricism’ of William James, as well successive inheritors such as Alfred North Whitehead (1978), Gilles Deleuze (1986, 1988, 1994), Isabelle Stengers (2010), Gilbert Simondon (2009), Erin Manning and Brian Massumi (2014), Jane Bennett (2010), William Connolly (2005), Karen Barad (2007) and Steven Shaviro (2014). Writing in the early 1900s, James (1976, 1996) outlined a philosophy decisively grounded in the fecund event of experience. It is essential to understand that James does not propose anything like a phenomenological reduction on the basis of a stable subject of experience but instead affirms experience itself as prior to both its subjects and its objects. According to Massumi’s (2016: 116) interpretation of James, ‘pure experience is worlding. It is the constitutive process of the world’s emergence.’ James took issue with the rationalist philosophy of his day, charging it with a fixation on universals and a privileging of wholes understood as prior to their parts. His, in contrast, was to be ‘a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts’ that ‘starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order’ (James, 1976: 22). This approach is an inherently processual one, in which ‘what really exists is not things made, but things in the making’ (James, 1996: 117). Accordingly, radical empiricism does not produce an ontology in the sense of a hierarchy of being for the organization of reality. As Didier Debaise (2005: 104) puts it, ‘everything is taken on the same plane: ideas, propositions, impressions, things, individuals, societies. Experience is this diffuse, tangled ensemble of things, movements, becomings, relations, without primary distinction, without founding principle.’ From the theoretical ground demarcated thus far, three principles of a martial empiricism should be highlighted. First, martial empiricism is interested in a world that appears as ‘a fabric of interlaced, superimposed relations, of telescoped events’ (Lapoujade, 2000: 193). While a pragmatic bounding of experience may be necessary, nothing can be excluded a priori, no matter how morally repugnant or seemingly banal, if we are to account for war’s promiscuity. Second, like experience, war is replete with dualisms that have to be attended to as provocations but not accepted as natural divisions. One such instance concerns the articulation between the supposed constancy of the general concept of war and the perpetual mutations in its manifestations as warfare. In reality, war is both a thing and a process, a unity and an assembly, an event and an ecology of relations (Grove, 2014). War’s relations do not only bind parts into wholes at the service of structural functionalities; they also constitute multiplicities of difference that possess no less integrity for the contingent assembly of their constituent elements. Third, every investigation of war explores a different field of experience that requires a bespoke attention and theoretical development native to that field. No Bousquet, Grove and Shah 105 conceptualizations are ever exhaustive of reality; they are only ever partial and contextual. Martial empiricism is not a theory of war. It is a theory of the conditions of possibility for asking what war does and means in the first place. Positing becoming over being, we necessarily privilege novelty and difference over stability and recurrence, with the former having to explain the latter rather than the reverse. We also prioritize relations over dualisms, since the world of becoming is no more split between ideas and matter than it is between subjects and objects or structure and agency. Everything is a transaction between the organizational character of a particular arrangement of things and the ways in which those things make sense of the world through that organizational character. We are all singular blocks of becoming that are simultaneously imbricated in each other. Similarly, we value process over causality. The investigation of continuities in a world of becoming suggests that any causal explanation only appears as such through a decontextualization of the transactional processes that support it. Radical empiricism and processual ontology imply that there is no rational base camp from which to set off in the study of a process – all research is necessarily in media res. One always begins ‘in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25). We are always in the middle of war, in a world already saturated with the history, present and anticipation of war. This is not to say that its manifestations, intensities and destructions are evenly distributed. Yet no war emerges without the conspiracy of the cosmos. The explicit and visible character of that complicity moves each day from the abstract metaphysical to the concrete actual as war draws into its gravitational pull polities, economies, technologies and ideologies. There is no end to war’s metabolic appetite, and what it does not devour and incorporate, it creates new from whole cloth. But where do you start investigating something with no outside, no beginning or end, no enduring substance? How do you know what to look for in the first place if the world is a non-repeating flux? One must necessarily hold a provisional idea of what war is in order to begin enquiring into it. But that idea must remain fuzzy enough to accommodate the novelty and mutability inherent in its becoming – an ‘anexact yet rigorous’ conception in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987: 407) formulation. Likewise, the more specific processual sketches to be outlined within the empirical field of war can be thought of as renderings of what Whitehead (1978: 86) calls ‘lures’. In complexity science, these lures are the strange attractors that draw dynamic systems to certain recursive yet never identical patterns of behaviour, from atmospheric flows to crowd movements. Crucially, Whitehead’s lures are emphatically not Platonic ideals imperfectly instantiated in the world, but refer instead to ‘potentials for the process of becoming’ from which concrete things or events emerge (Whitehead, 1978: 29). The contributions to this special issue each stake their own claims and investigative terrains through their attentiveness to how war engenders martial life and demands new modes of empiricism equal to it. Rather than summarizing each of the pieces, we outline below the distinct yet overlapping domains of war’s becoming that coalesce through their collective resonance. With the ultimate aim of orienting future research, we identify the intensive processes of war encapsulated by mobilization, design and encounter. Mobilizing war A term that first entered military parlance in the 1830s, mobilization denotes the ways in which resources are conscripted, regimented and deployed into martial worlds. Through this becomingmobile, prior attachments are cast off, life-forms are refashioned and rearranged, wild energies are stoked, amassed and directed. The particular affinity of war with speed has of course been noted 106 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) (Virilio, 2006). But it would be a mistake to focus only on the obvious weapon systems or even the accompanying rhythms of production, communication and exchange. Different velocities are also involved in both the galvanizing of affects – glory, honour, animosity, all the passions without which Clausewitz admitted war would be impossible – and the new cadences of becoming that transport beings in war. While mobilization is inherent in every war, a broad historical intensification and deepening of its processes has been a salient feature of modern societies. The German veteran Ernst Jünger was probably the first to fully conceptualize mobilization when he wrote in the 1930s of the ‘growing conversion of life into energy, the increasingly fleeting content of all binding ties in deference to mobility’, anticipating a state of total mobilization in which ‘there is no longer any movement whatsoever – be it that of the homeworker at her sewing machine – without at least indirect use for the battlefield’ (Jünger, 1992: 126).6 As historical sociologists have amply demonstrated, the unfolding of world history in the past five hundred years is unintelligible without reference to the tremendous development of the means of destruction that came to nest within the nation-state and attained a new escape velocity in 1914 (Mann, 1986, 1993; Tilly, 1992). Through bouts of intense competition, states placed their entire populations in arms, invoking homeland, virtue or historical destiny and summoning figures of absolute enmity so as to corral the energies that might deliver a decisive blow to the adversary. Placing war in the 20th century under the sign of ‘work’, the instrumental rationalization of life, relentless optimization and the central role of technique, Jünger diverged above all from Karl Marx in that he did not see capital accumulation as the mainspring of modern societies but instead a more fundamental drive for power that found its purest expression in the warring activity.7 Although his elevation of war into a redemptive metaphysics outlines a black hole that a martial empiricism should always guard against, Jünger’s interventions do emphasize the difficulties that war has always presented to an orthodox Marxism that would resort to a crude economism to account for it. Other thinkers, such as Georges Bataille (1988), J. F. C. Fuller (1998), and Deleuze and Guattari (1987), have produced ‘general economies’ of war that attend to a wider field of investments, exchanges and expenditures and should accordingly retain our attention (see Meiches on Bataille, 2020). Just as war cannot be apprehended solely through its instrumental appropriations, a lucid understanding of human societies cannot treat war as merely a peripheral or derivative phenomenon.8 Moreover, it would be misguided to believe ourselves beyond the era of total mobilization. Entire nations may no longer face the likely prospect of being in arms strictly speaking, but the annihilatory powers amassed by them still indefinitely hang over us in the guise of a thermonuclear sword of Damocles. States of war and peace, civilian and military spheres, blur ever more in the unrelenting age of globalized targeting, counterinsurgency, criss-crossing circuits of innovation from MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to Silicon Valley to DARPA (The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), and the intensifying societal securitization to which we affixed the now almost quaint denomination of ‘war on terror’. As for the key mobilizing activity of logistics so central to the global capitalist economy, it not only originates in the conduct of warfare (Cowen, 2014) but is now so prominent within it that Paul Virilio affirms, somewhat hyperbolically, that it has ‘become the whole of war’ (Virilio and Lotringer, 2008: 103). We thus take one of the tasks of martial empiricism to be to investigate the historical escalation and proliferation of mobilization, to trace the ebbs and flows of its extensions and intensities in the various fields into which it has been invested. Attention must here be directed as much to its overarching frames of intelligibility as to the minutiae of its micropolitical practices (Öberg, 2020). The particular marshalling of the human body, in its somatic, cognitive and affective capacities, is here paramount. Be it via the psychomotricity of the musculoskeletal frame and its nervous system of reflexes, perceptual and neurocognitive faculties, or the affective states of anger, fear and Bousquet, Grove and Shah 107 communal bonding, the human organism has been comprehensively enlisted into the war machine (McSorley, 2020). The age-old conduct of military training for instilling discipline and esprit de corps in the new recruit is certainly paradigmatic, with drill exercises persisting today as a chief ritual through which individuals are integrated into the ranks of military organizations (Foucault, 1995; McNeill, 1995). Yet, if repetitive drill and docile obedience to hierarchical command remain valued, late modern military institutions with organizational cultures that increasingly resemble those of their civilian counterparts are also today less prone to rely on nakedly authoritarian means to ensure individual compliance and dependability (Howell, 2015; Moskos et al., 2000). The ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ have deepened considerably since their incipience in the disciplinary techniques of the 17th century (Foucault, 1990: 139). The capillary microphysics of military power extend themselves ever further through the fields of biochemistry, neuropsychology, pharmacology and genetics (Coker, 2013; Krishnan, 2016). Military weaponry and equipment are no less important in soliciting, orienting and steering the human agent, their design guided by principles of ‘human systems integration’ into the war machine (Pew and Mavor, 2007). The methods employed for the purpose of mobilization vary, but their core objective remains constant: to augment the individual’s contribution to assembled combat power and ward off the thresholds beyond which the compound effects of stress, pain and fatigue induce its degradation and eventual collapse (Kinsella, 2020). Indeed, among all the spheres of human activity, it is plausibly within that of armed conflict that the previously established limits of the body are most persistently and spectacularly breached. Borrowing the Spinozist cry vocalized by Gilles Deleuze (1988: 17), we can exclaim: ‘we do not even know what a martial body can do!’ None of the above should imply an overly restrictive or monolithic conception of mobilization. For one thing, the purview of mobilization is evidently not restricted to the statist institutions that have otherwise advanced its techniques to their highest point. It encompasses, for instance, the combustive chain reaction of (self-)radicalization undergone by jihadis or white nationalists in their becoming-war, along with the specific roles played by ideological conversion, catalytic peer groups, paramilitary training, and the administration of steroids or amphetamines. Informal banking networks and internet crowdfunding platforms likewise support modes of martial patronage, incitement and entrepreneurialism that bypass the state form (Grove, 2019). No less important are the oppositions, subversions and surfeits that the solicitations of the war machine encounter everywhere. We find among these open resistances to the headlong rush to war as well as small, concealed and repeated acts of disobedience and denial. Conversely, there is the fierce indocility of the very energies stoked by mobilization, which are by their very nature uncompliant in their expressions. For war is a domain of transgression and excess that never fully reconciles with the governmental imperatives of utility, calculus and restraint (Meiches, 2020). Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 358) thus invoke the ‘fundamental indiscipline of the warrior’ waging a struggle against the forces that would pare them down to an instrumental function. The study of mobilization must therefore also include all that resists, disobeys and exceeds its injunctions (Lisle, 2020). Finally, as MacLeish (2020) so poignantly reminds us, processes of demobilization and the smouldering remainders and abominable residues left in the aftermath of war are no less worthy of our consideration.

#### We turn war into models in every debate, our impacts are our enemies, and we plan carefully the precise tactics needed to eliminate them. This schematization is an effort not to fix the ends but to solely engage with the means themselves- we try to make war into a knowable moment but only end up sanitizing war, killing becomes justified as precise, understandable, and clean thus rationalizing all violence and legitimizing it. The more we try to know war the more war will know us.

Bousquet et al 20 (Antoine Bousquet, Jairus Grove, Nisha Shah, “Becoming War: Towards a Martial Empiricism”,2020) GP

If mobilization addresses the marshalling of resources – bodies, affects and materiel – towards violent ends, we propose design as the frame by which to investigate the concretization of war’s means – or what is generally referred to as warfare. Given its realization in destructive techniques and tools for the purpose of obliterating life and the will to resist with maximum efficiency, the philosophical shadow cast over the activity of design renders it a particularly apposite concept. 108 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) Indeed, as Singleton (2011) shows, design has always been associated with deviousness and duplicity, a realm of schemes, plots and contrivances, where craft is synonymous with craftiness. Recovering the specific ‘cunning intelligence’ known to the ancient Greeks as metis, Detienne and Vernant (1991: 47) highlight those ‘activities in which man [sic] must learn to manipulate hostile forces too powerful to be controlled directly but which can be exploited despite themselves’. Alongside the machinations against nature that ‘give craftsmen their control over material which is always more or less intractable to their designs’, they identify ‘the stratagems used by the warrior the success of whose attack hinges on surprise, trickery or ambush’ (Detienne and Vernant, 1991: 47–48). Characterized by remarkable, wicked feats of technical and tactical ingenuity and decisively shaped by existential confrontation with an enemy that must be outwitted – if necessary, by means of trickery and deception – war is arguably the field of human activity that most accords with the conspiratorial spirit of design. This provocation of ‘war by design’ is inspired by Simone Weil’s (1987: 241) insistence that ‘the most defective method possible’ for apprehending war is ‘in terms of the ends pursued, and not by the nature of the means employed’. Armed conflicts cannot be reduced to the political motivations or moral justifications that legitimate them. Ends are pursued with specific means, generating war as a particular kind of force. Little, therefore, can be gleaned or done about war without ‘having first of all taken apart the mechanism of the military struggle’ (Weil, 1987: 241). Grégoire Chamayou (2015) accordingly calls for ‘political technicians’ to uncover and expose war’s core operations in all their intelligibility and compulsion. Indeed, in grasping the functioning of an actual device, the technical study of war can ‘discover the implications of how it works for the action that it implements’ (Chamayou, 2015: 15). Attention is thereby directed towards war’s mechanisms and the apparatuses through which warfare is assembled and executed. Design implies a remit much broader than the obvious instruments of warfare, such as weapons or other such material objects inserted in the wider machinations of war. Nor can design be confined to formal military institutions and their associated research-and-development complexes, particularly in an age of proliferating ‘dual-use’ technologies, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 3D-printed firearms, dark-web supply chains, cyberhacking and paramilitary swarm tactics. Rather, a focus on the instrumentality of warfare should be broadened to ‘the ways in which the art of war – its tools, its tactics and its tenor – is generated and governed’ (Shah, 2017: 90). To this end, design allows war to be ‘glimpsed in action’ (Singleton, 2011: 5) in the concatenation of actors, objects and operations that are not just implicated in but generative of a ‘savage ecology’ (Grove, 2019). A focus on design pries open the concrete activities of organized violence, revealing how they cohere and combine to make certain forms of war possible or impossible. Attention is brought to contours (the spaces and objects that delineate the stage within which war is set) and repertoires (the registers of permissible actions that can be performed), revealing how form and function are implied in one another in schemes, signatures and subterfuges. At a first pass, the schemes of war can be recognized within the tactical directives, operational procedures and strategic manoeuvres that animate military organizations and are subject to continuous reflexive exercises.9 More fundamentally still, schemes can be thought of as schematics, diagrams of operation through which bodies, implements and terrains are arranged into apparatuses of war. While all these various elements may not have been designed from the outset to serve war, as they fall within its ambit they acquire new martial functions, all the while exerting their own respective influences on the resulting ensembles. One can evoke here the human–spear–shield assemblage of the Nguni warrior, the human–stirrup–horse of cavalry, or the human–radio–rifle of the modern platoon, in their various tactical deployments (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Protevi, 2013). Denman (2020) addresses the architectural topographies of war, a history encompassing rudimentary earthworks, Vauban’s geometric fortifications and today’s wider enlistment of the Bousquet, Grove and Shah 109 built environment, all of which exist in relation to topologies of terrain and territory (see also Elden, 2013; Hirst, 2005; Scott, 2016; Weizman, 2007). As diagrams of power (Deleuze, 1986), schemes should not be viewed in terms of mere technical exercises, which is how their own designers are frequently prone to regarding them, but as micropolitical activities through which forms of warfare are summoned, conducted, reproduced and even anticipated (Öberg, 2020). Every war has its signature features. These range from the fashioned characteristics of its infrastructure, weaponry and soldiers to the more emergent traits of its collisions, injuries and devastations. All are subject to attempts at calibrating them, with the resulting expressions of armed conflict the product of intentional design’s encounter with both wilful resistance and recalcitrant reality.10 At stake is not merely the optimal allocation of limited resources towards instrumental ends but also the legitimation of the act of killing through conformity with established norms or laws. A firearm must efficiently convert a thermodynamic explosion into directed lethality, yet it must also not result in injury that is superfluous or unnecessary (Ford, 2019; Shah, 2017). The dead body is not just the net outcome of a direct hit, but an ideal, the pursuit of a legitimate kind of killing through the effect of military engineering, scientific experimentation and medical observation under legal and moral judgement. Attending to such details as the calibre of bullets is thus not a way of sanitizing the study of war from its deadly effects but, on the contrary, a means to understanding how those effects are ‘standardized’ within the military repertoire (Dittmer, 2017). More broadly, standardization alludes to the broader role of protocol in warfare, ranging from seemingly mundane quotidian routines or sartorial requirements to the standard operating procedures by which lethal violence is executed (Monk, 2020). In each of these instances, specific protocols impart on war particular styles that cannot be apprehended solely by reference to instrumental designs but are also necessarily expressive of a particular aesthetic or ethos (Meiches, 2017). Finally, war is the realm of subterfuge. Returning to the roots of design in deception and trickery, we recall that war is conducted through an encounter with an opposing force that must be anticipated and negated. As Lisle’s study of bomb disposal robots illustrates (2020), advanced militaries are prone to losing sight of this, obsessed with optimizing their own processes and perfecting their technologies, but are invariably reminded of it, not least because it is the principal way by which they are foiled by supposedly inferior adversaries. Throughout the ages, belligerents have devised countless stratagems towards the dissimulation of their presence, movements and intentions, as well as the proactive disinformation and misdirection of their antagonists. The particular instantiations of these can be found in the various techniques of camouflage, stealth, disguise, decoy and deception that populate the history of war (Bousquet, 2018). The more general figure here is that of the trap, laid to lure the target by exploiting its habits and proclivities so as to ensnare it in a situation in which its strengths can be offset or even turned against itself. Chamayou (2012) has coined the term ‘cynegetics’ to denote the kinship between war and hunting – the predatory character of power counterposed to the commonly inherited image of pastoral care under biopolitics. War is a hunt, the pursuit of another that can hunt you back. Last but not least, with etymological roots in the Latin for ‘flight’, subterfuge also hints at the elusive becoming of war that no snare can ever wholly capture, however carefully designed. Encountering war Through the mobilizations and designs of armed force, martial empiricism leads us ultimately to the encounter with war understood at its paroxysm as the fulminant meeting of hostile forces, the searing immersion into its experiential crucible. The forces of becoming are at their most unbridled here in their forbidding convulsions of intertwined destruction and creation. Events are permeated with contingency and unpredictability, or that which Clausewitz referred to as the ineradicable 110 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) element of ‘chance’ in war. At ground level, the encounter with war directs us to its very sensate experience. After all, war is equally waged by the senses (the weapon as extension of the eye), through the senses (its surfeit of sensations ranging from excruciating pain to sublime exaltation) and on the senses (the blinding, bewildering and enervation of perception). We take inspiration from Michel Serres (2016), who opens his book on the senses with a recollection of his time in the French Navy. Through extensive fire training on his ship, he learns to breathe in smoky rooms, crawl through cramped, dark, crowded tunnels and navigate his surroundings using only his sense of touch. Yet all of this knowledge remains ‘academic’ until the moment an actual fire declares itself in the vessel’s hull. Upon hearing the munitions on the ship detonate, he realizes his only chance for survival is to push through a small, rusty porthole. The moment of theoretical illumination comes as he finds himself stuck in the porthole, staring out at a glacial sea with his back exposed to the searing flames, one half of his body freezing while the other is burning. Serres (2016: 19) writes, ‘I was inside, I was outside. Who was this “I”?’ In that instant, the ‘I’ became a body that ‘proclaims, calls, announces, sometimes howls the I like a wounded animal’. In that moment of desperation, the body fissures, another ‘I’ emerges, not the ‘I’ of the cogito but that of pure experience. The confrontation with existential peril is for Serres not just one more experience among others collected and indexed by a persistent ‘I’ but one that forges an altogether new ‘I’ from within it. The subject revealed during those fateful minutes resonates with James’s counter-intuitive claim that we are, in each fleeting moment, nothing more than a bundle of experience in the flux of becoming. In the moment of pain and crisis, the disjunctive character of Serres’s legs, arms, torso, head and sensations dismembers Kant’s supposed ‘spontaneous accord of the faculties’. What Serres learnt that day is that there is nothing spontaneous or necessary about the habituated accord of the faculties. The faculties and our sense of self are, like everything else, transitory coalescences drawn from the stream of experience. Cardinal as it may be, the encounter with war does not reduce to the conflagration of battle but encompasses a multiplicity of locales, durations and affects. War is diversely experienced by its participants as a cacophony of fear, anxiety, love, grief, rage, boredom, reminiscence, longing and elation, to which sleep offers merely a temporary respite (Kinsella, 2020). Many soldiers describe missing war and its unparalleled heightening of human existence, but all wrestle with its fundamental unintelligibility and foreignness, one way or another. In Michael Herr’s (1991) Dispatches from the Vietnam War, war appears as a kind of collective insanity in which soldiers struggle to make sense of the absurd situations the designs of war have placed them in. William Spanos (1993) notes that the entire Vietnamese earth came to be experienced as hostile by US soldiers. These soldiers could feel the enmity of trees, mosquitos, humidity, shadows and small children. What is it to feel enmity as opposed to merely acquiescing to its legal declaration or semiotic identification by official uniforms? The realm of feeling in war in all its complexities and gradations is one that has still received insufficient attention in our disciplines. The study of war experience goes well beyond collecting and relaying the combat testimonies or personal narratives of participants, however. Navigating the field of martial experience demands close attention to the depersonalizing shock of pure experience, the complex interactions between various affects, and the modes of intelligibility that attempt to make sense of and commandeer those affects. Through his enquiry into affective excess in total war, Ben Anderson (2010: 168) enjoins us to move beyond an amorphous general category of affect to understand how specific affects are ‘imbricated with mutable and variable modes of power that differ in their targets, desired and actual outcomes, hinges, and spatial forms’. Attending to the sensory and affective dimensions of war requires inspecting both the battlescapes in which combat occurs and all the other spaces in which bodies are primed and conditioned for fighting in the first place. Kinsella’s contribution (2020) on the regulation of sleep in war and the successes and failures of military interventions in Bousquet, Grove and Shah 111 the governance of slumber is exemplary. To consider sleep or its privation as part of the formative milieu of war draws us to the rhythms and processes of the body that both set the stage for martial experience and themselves constitute sites of power and contestation. In turn, Kirby’s unsettling investigation into sexual violence (2020) troubles our understandings of corporeal investments and mobilizations in the most intimate and traumatic of encounters. The supple affective terrain of experience certainly has not escaped the cunning intelligence of war. Tactics of ‘shock and awe’ and campaigns to ‘win hearts and minds’ seek to modulate the experience of war to produce specific outcomes. Bombs and bullets are made to persuade, convert and inspire as much as to kill and destroy. Peter Sloterdijk (2011) refers to the invasive ecology of warfare – the targeting of the material and immaterial connective tissues of our life-worlds – as ‘atmoterrorism’. From this perspective, the progress of war is nothing less than the ceaseless search for ‘new surfaces of vulnerability’ (Sloterdijk, 2011: 28), from breathable air and drinkable water to ideological beliefs and psychological states. For Massumi (2015), colour-coded terror levels, mutual assured destruction, and IEDs all trade on the volatile stock market of affective intensities that are no less real for their ethereal character. Atmospheres of war that extend far beyond the identifiable physicality of conflict are always enveloping us. By virtue of violence’s ‘super-empirical’ character – its immaterial affective charge – a witness can be ‘struck by the performed remainder of force as certainly as the recipient of the blow’ (Massumi, 2015: 87). Violence does not reduce to the infliction of broken bodies and bleeding wounds. War cuts deeper. It is through the affective register that scholars like McSorley (2012) or Daggett (2015) are able to convey the militarized sensorium of helmetcams or the queering embodiments of drone interfaces. Gun sights, night-vision goggles and drone cameras are not so much perceptual extensions to pre-existing subjects as interpolations into the flux of deterritorialized affect from which martial subjectivities emerge. From such points of entry, the primary stuff of war increasingly appears less like an assortment of weapons, drilled bodies and formations than, as per McSorley’s olfactory exploration (2020), a synesthetic congerie of visions, sounds, smells, touches, memories and emotions. The question here is not so much how to make sense of war as how war makes the senses. Accordingly, the apprehension of war’s encounter cannot limit itself to an interpretation of its representations. Through MacLeish’s engagement with the veteran life (2020), we learn that experience exceeds the immediately physical and yet retains a real effectivity on the world over and above the meanings invested in its representations. Even if they cannot be discerned in the discrete, continuous space of the material world, affective intensities overflow any representation we can make of them. The capture of the flux of experience through the media of language, paper, film, museums and monuments has no privilege over scar tissue, synaptic patterns, social relations and the planet’s epidermis. Martial empiricism is no more a naive realism in which everything is directly observable and measurable than it is an endless hermeneutics through which the world is made subservient to our interpretations of it. In war, through war, beyond war, the tumult of conflict periodically unsettles and shatters the reality principle of our understandings. Rather than call the participants of war that undergo such journeys ‘unreliable’ witnesses or ‘unstable’ subjects, we would rather redirect these seismic shifts in perspective onto the myth of recurrent experience. While not its sole privilege, war surely presents an inordinate challenge to the normalization of first world, suburban, sheltered experience, in which repetition and sameness are mistaken for a given principle or norm of both daily existence and scholarly investigation rather than the prerogative of particular dwellings. Yet we have now become painfully aware that city centres and public transportation are everywhere liable to precipitously transmute into sites of carnage that strike at beings in their most quotidian existences. Concurrently, drone pilots in the heart of the Nevada suburbs commute home through rows of box 112 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) stores, returning to their families after putting in a shift hunting men across the rocky terrains of Waziristan. The humdrum domesticity of the everyday coexists with the systemic unleashing of deadly force. Rather than pick a side between thinkers like Veena Das (2007), who underlines the ordinariness of violence, and Adriana Cavarero (2009), who demands that we confront the ‘horrorism’ of our contemporary atrocities, we position martial empiricism in the interval between the normality and the pathology of war. Following this lead highlights how war choreographs the transitions from one field of consistent experience to another, and how the accompanying disruptions congeal into new consistencies. How else can we make sense of the forever and everywhere wars of the 21st century (Filkins, 2008; Gregory, 2011) and the lacerations of remote force projection and pop-up guerrillas that punctually erupt across the globe? An empirical account of war organized by sensuous experience leads us back to the ‘great outdoors’ of Levinas’s opening provocation – war at the crossroads of totality and boundless alterity. However, the other of war, contra Levinas, is not just the problem of other human minds. Consciousness indeterminably bleeds into other forms of life, distributed among animals and machines – the horses, dogs, pigeons or dolphins of war, their biomimetic counterparts, and other algorithmic presences (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015). We already have phenomenological accounts surveying the umwelts of drone operators and their targets (Daggett 2015; Holmqvist, 2013). New frontiers lie beyond in the burgeoning inner lives of our machines and their otherworldly experiences of us. Grounding our study in a speculative and radical account of experience entails an openness to varieties of martial experience that outstrip our imaginations or predictions. War continually struggles to become conscious of itself. If unbridled deregulation of the senses and emergent subjectivities are inherent in war, how are we to realize a philosophical engagement with war? It is not enough to say that philosophical thought should interpret or represent war for us. We are not, in the final instance, interested in a theory of war but in how war provokes thought itself. For the frame of encounter necessarily pushes us deeper into the question of what holds war together. War is no more reducible to the litany of entities that make it up – from bullets, bombs and bandages to battlefields, bodies and battalions – than it is to an unmediated exertion of political will. The promiscuous relations of parts to wholes are an essential research problem, but their apprehension is inchoate without the stream of consciousness that experiences war. The empiricism pursued here – with its emphasis on affect, embodiment and sensation – is a martial empiricism because it is forged in the very crucible of war. Rather than being merely the agent provocateur of some other line of thought, war is permitted to be its own site of inquiry and theoretical elaboration.

#### Thus to become war we must affirm war- only an affective switch out of the squo creates the opportunity for bifurcation.

Groves 11, (Jairus Victor Groves, BECOMING WAR: ECOLOGY, ETHICS, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF VIOLENCE, 2011, A dissertation submitted to John Hopkins for a PhD)GP

Not so, becoming war is a suspended present. Like the bullet time of The Matrix in which the incredible speed of moment produces an interminable slowness there must a 219 moment of duration just before war that makes possible no-war. To understand war as a becoming is not only lay bare the facile and destitute liberal understanding of peace but to open exploration of a becoming otherwise than war. Such a becoming cannot be peace and is apt to be illegible to the current indexes of war and peace. The normative markers of peace—the absence of conflict—need not define the limit of possible becomings otherwise than war. Becoming agonistic, becoming active, becoming rage, becoming justice, becoming quiet, becoming still, becoming disobedient, becoming graceful, becoming kind, becoming indifferent, becoming defiant, becoming gentle, becoming sacrifice, becoming fire (as many monks in Vietnam did and at least three individuals in the US have in the face of the Iraq war), becoming generous, becoming courageous... The restoration of belief in the world requires an affirmation of being in excess of a regulative or repressive model of peace. We must reject the model of peace exemplified by peacekeeping. War cannot be restrained, repressed, or deferred. The return of the repressed is often the outcome of managerial practices of peace. To approach peace of this kind is to translate war into standing reserve—saved up, stockpiled, trained, honed, targeted, scenario planned. Each model of peace defines a pole of international politics. One can see at the heart of the attempt to distinguish peace from war the absurdity of deterrence or hegemony. After all, peace is a funny way to characterize either the nuclear threat of the United States—the only country to use an atomic weapon—or the racial division of Israel and Palestine watched over by the Blue Helmets of the UN. War cannot be disowned or expelled It must be diverted by other incipient becomings. Other forks must be taken, the moment just before war must be extended and 220 inhabited so such that the otherwise becomes apparent. This does not require that the world slow down. It might require that we unblock certain flows corralled by the aborescent strategies of fortress state craft. Redirecting the affective economies of war towards other attachments—arguments, justice, compassion, forgiveness, politics, resistance, grief, art, beauty, the world—cannot be accomplished by repression or separation—that is a recipe for ressentiment. In refugee camps, detention camps, on either sides of walled borders, identities assert themselves, harden and intensify. The wasteland grows. War cannot be disavowed or expelled as in the Kantian tradition. Only the affirmative has the power to make the otherwise possible. The seeming intolerability of affirming destitution, battle, conflict, violence as part of life—a becoming of the body— brings into focus the possibility of becoming otherwise than war. War is most present, most under our jurisdiction when it is part of us rather than exterior or external to us. To understand the process of becoming war is to understand the possibility of becoming something else. If we externalize or banish war to the place of evil or outside we lose our grasp on its most vital, generative lifeline: ourselves. Affirming war as being human, all to human brings into focus the subtle changes in ourselves that draw us to the moments between war and otherwise than war. In this moment—returned to us by a kind of attunement—we find the other practices, bodily dispositions, emotions: grief rather than rage, compassion rather than revenge, determination rather than resignation. For some the otherwise will only give contrast to the power of hate or rage to overcome other impulses, but in others it may spawn other directions; new questions, alternatives to the dissatisfaction or burn out from rage, hate, and revenge. 221 Desperation may not always lead to the same result if returned to a fork in the stream of becoming rather than the inevitable requirements of the stultified responses of bombing, killing, starving, incarcerating, deterring, sanctioning, hating. New machines can be released into an assemblage, new cutting edges, new transfigurations and modifications—metamorphoses. Something imperceptible to the liberal eye that sees war as contrary to human nature and imperceptible to the Realist eye that sees war as the tragic inevitability of human nature. Each is a commitment to the human as being rather than becoming. Each fails to see possibilities contained in a body that evolves and carries potential to continue evolving. This is how we should read Nietzsche's aphorism that to deny war is to deny biology, to deny evolution. It is not as Fascists and those that dismiss Nietzsche as Fascist (these two schools of thinkers being in agreement. It is telling that Richard Wolin and Adolf Hitler read Nietzsche the same way, badly, violently) would read this aphorism that war is necessary and inevitable, but that war is the result of subtle, contingent, not inevitable, selections. When one blurs or confounds the culture/nature divide, as Jane Bennett, Alfred North Whitehead, William E. Connolly, Henri Bergson, Manuel DeLanda Brian Goodwin and others have (the list grows longer each day), one discerns the practices that give rise to tendencies such of war. And one also sees the subtle possibilities of selecting other tendencies, other practices, and other dispositions. This view of Evolution is not determinism. It is the condition and insistence of modification and change. Each modification confronting the possibility of multiple directions, trajectories, lines of flight, new practices, and experiments. Like all experiments from winged reptiles to speech, some fall flat on their face and others 222 produce sonnets. But at each moment of modification time forks, slows to a near halt, like a drop of water just before it separates from its source. In complexity theory such a moment is called a bifurcation. Delanda explains: Futhermore, even if we are destined to follow the attractors guiding our dynamical behavior, there are also bifurcations, critical points at which we may be able to change our destiny (that is modify our long-term tendencies). And because minuscule fluctuations in the environment in which bifurcations occur may decide the exact nature of the resulting attractors, on can hardly conclude that all actions we undertake—as individuals or collectively—are irrelevant in the face of these deterministic forces. Bifurcations may not be a "guarantee of freedom," but they certainly do provide a means of experimenting with—and perhaps even modifying our destinies.347 For those attuned to such possibilities—the succession of moments passing from one alteration to the next—the inevitability of the next moment cascades into a set of possibilities. The Israeli soldiers who suddenly won't pull the trigger; the flinch of a silo Captain when confronted by an incoming nuclear missile saving the world from a nuclear war almost triggered by an unusually rapid weather balloon rocket launched in Finland; Republican Governor George Ryan's sudden and unprecedented conviction of mercy and another justice; the inexplicable generosity of an Algerian Jew who returned the hatred of anti-Semitism with the impossible generosity and affirmation of deconstruction rather than the self-destructive drive of Zionism; love amongst state enemies; the impossible gesture of the ANC refusing to expel Afrikaners who once tortured and murdered them; career military officer William "Fox" Fallon who sacrificed his prestigious position as head of Central Command because he would not go along with the plan to attack Iran; the Delanda, 139, Incorporations, Zone 6. 348 In an act of defiance during the peak of Bush's war wongering leading up the release of the National Intelligence Report that revealed that Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons Fallon public announced, "This constant drumbeat of conflict is not helpful and not useful. I expect that there will be no war, and that is what we ought to be working for. We ought to try to do our utmost to create different conditions." See Thomas P.M. Barnett," The Man Between War and Peace," Esquire, March 11th, 2008. 223 cascading events of the Arab Spring. The miracle need not be transcendent—coming from outside the world, from a god—the incipient chaos of possibilities contained in every moment of becoming expresses my belief in immanent miracles or unpredictable moments of bifurcation.

### Cap answers

#### Martial politics supersedes cap

Grove 19, (Jairus Grove, Savage Ecology, 2019, Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa)GP

By turning Clausewitz’s words inside out, what we are left with is little more than war as an instrument; it is just that now war is waged on more fronts, both internal and external. This does nothing to complicate the concept of war. J. F. C. Fuller’s materialist account of the slugfest between what he calls the constant tactical factor and the quantity theory of war comes to a similar conclusion as Foucault, but the inversion of Clausewitz and the targeting of whole populations provokes an image quite dif­ferent from that of biopolitics. Instead, quoting Fuller from 1942: “War ceasing to be a struggle between life values becomes a blind destructive force, like an earthquake, a volcanic eruption or a typhoon. Whole populations are now attacked, wiped out, enslaved or herded from one country into another like cattle. . . . the entire life of the enemy state comes to be the object of attack.” Fuller continues quoting Ely Culbertson, “From time immemorial, men fought against men, and weapons were but accessories; in this and in future wars, machines fight From Exhaustion to Annihilation—105 against machines and men are all but auxiliaries . . . engines of destruction which devour their substance.95 This process occurs because war is an assembly of things set in motion and held together by the racial refrain of settler colonization, the imperial and postimperial transforms territory into operational space, and, as an assemblage, war is also transformed by those mutations and expansions. Following the ecological account developed in the last chapter, war is not a tool of the state or a failure of order. War is a phylum of organizing principles, refrains, and protocols unto itself. War drags along with it the whole of the population—its vitality, industry, inventiveness, movement, rhythm, and affect—and attests to the human and nonhuman character of the population and violently metabolizes other forms of life in its path. If we want to call war biopolitical, then bios must extend beyond the human and certainly the thin European conception of humanism, and even the nonhuman animal, into the creative anime of all things, and into the formative and energetic forces of war from its beginnings. Mass war was set loose by the French Revolution’s levée en masse as much as it was made possible by gunpowder, supply lines, radio, interchangeable parts, mass production, and the increasing speed and efficiency of transportation and communication of information, whether linguistic or otherwise, as well as new terrains of racialized enmity. All these feedbacks point to a milieu or ecology of war that, while overlapping with the market or the epistemophilia of nineteenth-century humanizing sciences, lured these assemblages into connection at least as much as Foucault’s account of late capitalism or humanist governmentality. Therefore, the constant tactical factor—war as mutative creativity—is not just an axiomatic or abstract machine of war. It is a global abstract machine traversing the war/nonwar divide; war individuates specific forms of life. Hence, we can talk about warlike relations and governance as a martial logic without having to find combat present in either of these conceptual expansions. This statement would seem consistent with those inspired by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, who seek to supplement Foucault by rebranding the global system an empire. However, while Negri describes the veritable deterritorialization of war, politics, economy, and life, he too quickly subsumes these deterritorializations under the logic of capitalism. For him, war is little more than a supplement or effect of capital: “War seems the only possible solution. . . . With the disappearance of the internal criteria that allow that self-regulation and self-valorization of development, it is the violence of the strongest that creates the norm. . . . it guarantees the smooth running 106—Chapter 3 of society and widens the terms of the market.”96 This is too simplistic, and perhaps this formulation should also be flipped on its head. War ought to be seen from the other side too as a martial machine with capitalist biopolitical effects, not just a capitalist axiomatic with martial effects. This would shift the emphasis from an anthropocentric preoccupation with human “states of emergency” or sovereign states of exception, or market failure, to the emergence of material assemblages that amplify human events such that they reverberate throughout the assembly of things. Within the analytic frame of capitalism, the microbial devastation of the Americas as well as the subsequent annihilation of forms of life would be incidental to the project of expansion rather than at their core. As a matter of historical development, the industrialization of war preceded the industrialization of civilian factories. The two most important components of industrialization—interchangeable parts and the assembly line—were developed because of the demands of larger and larger armies, not larger and larger civilian markets. Furthermore, the demand for American industrialization was not the result of an “invisible hand” but a directive of the War Department to create operations for arms production using interchangeable parts. Congressional funding for the directive resulted in a number of inventors competing for government contracts to mass-produce weapons that could be repaired more easily in the field. The winner, Thomas Blanchard, developed the technology for mass production that reverberated across the Atlantic, inspiring the images of cams featured in Jean le Rond d’Alembert and Denis Diderot’s Encyclopédie. The invention was Blanchard’s conceptual change that allowed cams to turn irregular forms. These early lathes developed by Blanchard inspired a wave of production mechanization in the United States and Europe. But Blanchard’s contract for the new lathes was exclusively with the Springfield Armory and only later was made available on the market for private factories. According to David Hounshell, the two main currents of American industrialization flowed from the Springfield armory system, and “the idea of uniformity or interchangeable parts was combined with the notion that machines could make things as good and as fast as man’s hands, or even better.”97 The aleatory milieu of war has its own efficacy independent of the logic of markets and modes of production and should be given its due. Despite the temptation to use capitalism as an explanatory logic for violence, the ecology of warfare as a martial logic exceeds the instrumentality of the market and profit drive of the market. Furthermore, the overem- From Exhaustion to Annihilation—107 phasis on capitalism and the provincial image of the European battlefield also complicate the more recent development of the global civil war theses found in Carlo Galli’s Political Spaces and Global War and Tiqqun’s Introduction to Civil War that, similar to Hardt and Negri, derive from Foucault’s account of biopolitics.98 The civil-martial divide prescripted in the move to say all war is now civil war requires that the civil peace that foregrounds classical war assumed by Foucault has ever existed in the first place. The accounts of McNeill, Fuller, Braudel, and Mumford as well as the historical record of martial development in the Americas suggest that the divide between the civil and the martial is a convenient fiction not unlike the state of nature. And insofar as the claim to an internal civic space (the zone of policing rather than war) can be made, it is in a very limited capacity and one entirely idiosyncratic of a very narrow temporal and geographic slice of Western Europe basically between the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15)—but again only if we ignore the globalization of warfare happening outside this narrow territorial limit from 1492 forward. From the larger historical and geographical vantage point, there is no classical period before the global civil war once the Europeanization of the globe began. From the beginning of European expansion, war was neither interior nor exterior, as the territory was in some sense a smooth space in that it had not been nationalized, much less internationalized. War took place, but it lacked the political quality that makes Foucault’s inversion possible. As such, the laws of war found in Hugo Grotius and early discussions of Christian traditions of just war were flagrantly disregarded, just as they had been in the European Crusades. And furthermore, decolonization does not return us to the romantic image of international politics either. In the aftermath of formal-legal colonization, everything is nationalized but virtually none of the new national spaces resembles what could be called a sovereign territory except for those spaces that cannot be fully decolonized because they are settler colonies.

#### Only the perm solves—no one system of power can be extracted from the Eurocene. The alt alone fails.

**Grove 19** (Jairus Victor Grove, Department of Political Science UH Manoa, *Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world*, 2019)//KB

I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how **climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering**. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.11 Departing from Sloterdijk, I am hesitant to so easily locate modernity or explication as the root or cause of the global catastrophe. **No single strategy, war, act of colonization, technological breakthrough, or worldview fully explains the apocalypse before us**. However, there is something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call a refrain that holds the vast assemblage together, a geopolitical melody hummed along with the global expansion of a form of life characterized by homogenization rather than diversification. Accordingly, if we are to make some sense of such a vast world that is, even for Crutzen and Birks, “quite complex and difficult to model,” I think we must consider the particular refrain of geopolitics that is capable of, by scientific as well as more humbly embodied standards, destroying worlds along with the world.12 **To eschew geopolitics simply because, as a refrain, it is too big, too grand, or too universal would ignore the conditions of possibility for nuclear weapons, power politics, and carbon-based globalization, and would greatly impoverish the explanatory capability of even the best climate models.** So maybe it is not so strange that Crutzen and others’ attention to the nuclear threat of great powers has all but disappeared despite the fact that Russia and the United States still possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and as of late have been all too vocal about using them. Instead, the Anthropocene, as envisioned by Crutzen as a universal concern, requires with it a depoliticization of the causes of that concern.

#### War is not an instrument of capitalism—it is the other way around. War is a constitutive part of the world we inhabit, making it both a root cause and an apriori impact for their K

**Grove 19** (Jairus Victor Grove, Department of Political Science UH Manoa, *Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world*, 2019)//KB

I am not suggesting that war is the only form of life. There are surviving forms of life interior and exterior to the Eurocene. No process of annihilation succeeds without leaving at least a trace.3 However, the normal workings of daily global life are a state of war. Rather than think of state of war in the juridical or theoretical sense, which distinguish war from peace on the grounds of declarations or measures of order, I want to consider war as an ecology endemic to the Eurocene. So by state of war I mean state in the sense that physicists or chemists think about states of matter. Every state of matter is an order, and despite that order, every state of matter has some elements of other states. A state of matter exhibits properties like solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, or the full-on freak-out of plasma but is not entirely made up of that state. And yet the state still has an effect despite that heterogeneity. So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state of war, is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what it is right now, not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become. Instead, the practices and organizations—from resource extraction, enclosure, carbon liberation, racialization, mass incarceration, border enforcement, policing and security practices, primitive accumulation by dispossession, targeted strikes, to allout combat—are relations of war rather than merely correlates or opportunities for a war metaphor. **To put it a bit more bluntly, politics, colonialism, settlement, capitalism, ecological destruction, racism, and misogynies are not wars by other means—they are war. War is not a metaphor; it is an intensive fabric of relations making the Eurocene**. To make this claim requires rethinking—somewhat bombastically—the meaning of war. If war has such a wide application, it would seem to mean nothing. In talks, roundtables, and casual conversations, colleagues have often suggested that such an expansive definition of war is polemical or even absurd. Others have said that spreading war so thin cheapens the sacrifices and tragedies of those who have experienced “real war.” It is curious to me that many of the same people have no difficulty assigning similar base or structuring characteristics to capitalism, settlement, or patriarchy. I do not see war as a replacement or a displacement of those structuring structures. Instead, war is like those other complicated, heterogeneous, abstract machines but interrelated and importantly semiautonomous in the making of the world. The importance of shifting the point of emphasis or break between war and other “big processes” is to emphasize the way collectively making death comes to be its own organizing ecology rather than just an instrumental means for other ecologies, such as racism or sexism or capitalism, that are often more obviously invested in ordering—subordinating orders—than destruction. Furthermore, I do not think, given the extreme level of violence and deprivation necessary to create the global ecology we now inhabit, that it is “a stretch” to call war the constitutive fabric of planetary relations. Instead, war as an intensive difference takes possession of other categories, at which point phase shifts take place in categories like racism or economics. What was the slow, lethal burn of postslavery policing escalates into the fury of outright combat in the streets, a race war in the streets of 1921 Tulsa or the 2015 streets of Baltimore. Even in our sacred texts of democratic theory, the pulsing tributaries of war run throughout descriptions of political formation. John Locke argued with little dispute that slavery was the institutionalization of war.4 And W. E. B. Du Bois said of the process of reconstruction after slavery that war had begun again, and in fact had never ended.5 Do we think that the same could not be said for the vast carceral project directed at black people described so well by Michelle Alexander or Loïc Wacquant?6

#### Cap cannot be the root cause of war—warfare cannot be explained by the market and profit drives

**Grove 19** (Jairus Victor Grove, Department of Political Science UH Manoa, *Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world*, 2019)//KB

Despite the temptation to use capitalism as an explanatory logic for violence, the ecology of warfare as a martial logic exceeds the instrumentality of the market and profit drive of the market. Furthermore, the overemphasis on capitalism and the provincial image of the European battlefield also complicate the more recent development of the global civil war theses found in Carlo Galli’s Political Spaces and Global War and Tiqqun’s Introduction to Civil War that, similar to Hardt and Negri, derive from Foucault’s account of biopolitics.98 The civil-martial divide prescripted in the move to say all war is now civil war requires that the civil peace that foregrounds classical war assumed by Foucault has ever existed in the first place. The accounts of McNeill, Fuller, Braudel, and Mumford as well as the historical record of martial development in the Americas suggest that the divide between the civil and the martial is a convenient fiction not unlike the state of nature. And insofar as the claim to an internal civic space (the zone of policing rather than war) can be made, it is in a very limited capacity and one entirely idiosyncratic of a very narrow temporal and geographic slice of Western Europe basically between the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15)—but again only if we ignore the globalization of warfare happening outside this narrow territorial limit from 1492 forward. From the larger historical and geographical vantage point, there is no classical period before the global civil war once the Europeanization of the globe began.

#### Alt fails

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I want to take up both premises as they make more explicit what is also central to Moore. First, I want to consider the question of capitalism as a failed social system planner, and whether the natural limits of the ecosystem represent an accelerant for capitalism’s contradictions. The claim that capitalism is at odds with social planning is simply unsustainable. After all, geopolitics is a form of global social planning, and maybe the largest ever, as it is a system of planetary management. The problem is that we have a progressive functionalist bias in what constitutes successful social planning. The global networks of surveillance, multicountry military operations, mutual security alliances, and transnational border, seaport, and airport cooperation suggest that capitalism can innovate and implement global-scale social systems with high degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. What is left out by Balakrishnan is that one can have vast and unprecedented social and economic planning without benefiting the majority of the planet. Balakrishnan, to his benefit, makes note of the vast socialization of capital in the form of health care and education for the benefit of industry. However, more importantly, I would add to the cost of educating workers and maintaining the health of workers the huge price tag of the American-led geopolitical order. The cost of the wars in Iraq to maintain access to oil runs in the trillions of dollars alone. Yet even in regard to climate change, clean water, species loss, and migration crises, it is true that vast capitalist social planning is in the works: for instance, ecomodernist proposals for geoengineering that consolidate the hegemony of a few great powers. They do this via climate control and cooling northern countries while devastating subtropical and tropical countries by slowing the rain cycles necessary for agriculture; through capital-intensive desalinization, which ensures water security for those who can afford it; and through synthetic meat and food production, which represents real alternatives to land-based food production but extraordinary capital input. All these strategies for “adapting” to the climate and ecological catastrophe—while currently being pursued—are rejected by academics as seemingly unrealistic because they do not scale for 10 billion people. However, it should be considered that the visions of an ecomodern vanguard are less concerned with the speed and feasibility of scale as long as there is enough for them. In fact, the most common critique by Marxists like Andreas Malm and neo-Keynesian ecologists like Naomi Klein is that such design schemes for cooler weather, clean water, and food security will leave potentially billions without the means to survive. From the ecomodernist perspective of elite blocks, that is, contemporary capitalism, so be it. Unlike Balakrishnan, Klein, and to a lesser degree Malm, the crisis of “failure” is just the next stage of what Klein calls elsewhere “disaster capitalism.”35 **The fact that these solutions do not provide for everyone, or might create periods of tumultuous transition, are not critiqued within the standards of the narrow few pursuing them.** Instead, the limited applications of industrial adaptation models are a virtuous form of managed scarcity and opportunity for the reconfiguration of governance. This transformation, while incipient, is for me a significant transformation between labor, contradiction, and political crisis. **It envisions a world, and then engineers a world that can live, and even thrive, without the majority of people currently alive on the planet. The limited survival and making of a new fully manageable planet is precisely a “system-wide economic renewal.”**36 The reconfiguration of the planet such that labor and resources play a significantly dif­ferent role than previously experienced may not exactly be capitalism as we have understood it, but neither is it Balakrishnan’s vision of a future created by Marx’s understanding of contradictions. Even the presumption of Foucault’s schema of biopolitical capitalism is that somehow capital cannot live without labor, and therefore contradictions, that is, immiseration, will create turbulence for revolt, even if not revolutionary change.37 In the biopolitical logic of labor, the threat of extermination is limited by the necessity of a population or mass to protect and to make live.38 However, in the schema developing among the futurists of Silicon Valley, this presumption is simply false. **Mass death at scales comparable and even exceeding the bubonic plague are no longer a problem for capital functioning.** In fact, it is quite the opposite: losing one-half or more of the global population if sufficiently contained by drones, space weapons, and other long-range autonomous weapons systems provides a great benefit to a certain class of an increasingly cosmopolitan elite who look forward to automated forms of labor that make human exploitation instrumentally even if not morally obsolete. The limit of Balakrishnan’s and for that matter Marx’s vision is and was the presumption that there are limits to what humans can bear materially and morally. Like Moore, Balakrishnan is simultaneously too optimistic and too pessimistic. These thinkers are too pessimistic about the creativity of the Eurocene, which historically has departed from classical capitalist logic and structure in important ways, while maintaining the consistency necessary to continue. Furthermore, they are too optimistic about the ways that consciousness and political action change under increasingly sadistic material conditions. A project of homogenization also hides behind the problematic logic of the contradiction of capital creating its alternative. **There is something quite dangerous in how this logic interiorizes resistant ontologies or uprisings against capital as “new.”** Of the many examples given by Moore and hinted at more obliquely by Balakrishnan, the insurgent ontologies, whether rural or indigenous, are exceedingly old. I do not mean in the sense that indigenous peoples are outside of time but in the sense that Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has used when he talks about “extra-moderns,”39 that is, forms of life that have creatively survived, so far, the onslaught of homogenization under the Eurocene. To classify these extramodern forms of life “new” or contingent upon the “contradictions” of cheap nature is to resign their cause and constitution to the logic of capitalism itself. And as such, this logic drags along with it a project of homogenization as a way of thinking, whereby the resistance or even indifference to the Eurocene is created by the Eurocene. Not unlike Marx’s insistence on proletarization as a necessary precondition of revolution, interiorizing struggles like “Idle No More” or the farmer revolts in India to the logic of contradiction is to rob them of what autonomy they have carved out against the dictates of development and modernization in both capitalist and Marxist iterations. These insurgent ontologies against extractivism are continuous across centuries of rebellion against the appropriation of land and resources. They are not a recent phenomenon created by the end of cheap nature. What is new, potentially, is that those of us consonant with a modern form of life have begun to care. Modern concern for extramodern struggles may well be because of the glaring crisis caused by lives built on and from cheap nature. However, to conflate that concern with the cause of those who provoked our concern is politically and ethically dangerous. Like the logic of the Anthropocene whereby the power to break the world somehow suggests the power to engineer the world, the interiorization of indigenous and rural struggles against the Eurocene enables many of the same assumptions about the grounds and legitimacy of global-scale governance, even if such forms of governance would be more indebted to cosmopolitan solidarity rather than elite geopolitical control. In the former, the difference is more sentimental than material, as the cosmopolitan solidarity of a new, more just ecological order would itself also be a project of incorporation and homogenization, except this time done in the name of the marginalized irrespective of their input or shared governance. Thus, while it is all well and good to declare allyship for struggles like Idle No More against the destruction of the planet, we should be careful that the grounds for agreement are not a prelude to a new enclosure.

#### Even if cap was, at some point, a root cause for war, the two have become so intertwined that the difference has become indistinguishable—making the root cause irrelevant and the perm the only solution

**Grove 19** (Jairus Victor Grove, Department of Political Science UH Manoa, *Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world*, 2019)//KB

The shift to guns and infantry further increased the need for supplies and the production of more weapons. The effect, according to Mumford and Fuller, was an increasing demand on industry to standardize arms.28 Mass production and an emphasis on numbers and repetition, rather than singularity and skill, takes place on the battlefield as much as or more than the early factories of commercial industrialization. According to Fuller, “The quality idea, upon which eighteenth-century fighting power was based, was, in the last lap of that century, steadily giving way to the quantity idea.”29 Again, here there was a martial logic for which mercantilism and proto-capitalism and industrialization were means rather than independent drivers. However, there was also a positive feedback between the demand for mass production, the resulting economic and resource demands on the state, the expansion of overseas conquest, and, therefore, war. **Even if there was a martial inception, once global networks and states locked into place, the difference between war for economic advantage and gaining economic advantage for war quickly became indistinguishable.**Two kinds of war emerge from the vicious circle of mercantilist states. European states fought other European states that were in competition for colonial exploitation, and they fought colonial wars of occupation and expropriation to pursue primitive accumulation and, later, settlement. Critical machines of capitalism played a vital role in the becoming global of this phenomena. The drive to institutionalize the mass death set off by first conquest in places like the Americas required new levels of speed and profit only made possible by finance and credit. According to Mumford: One abstraction reenforced the other. Time was money: money was power: power required the furtherance of trade and production: production was diverted from the channels of direct use into those of remote trade, toward the acquisition of larger profits, with a larger margin for new capital expenditures for wars, foreign conquest, mines . . . more money and more power. . . . Money grew in part out of the increasing mobility of late medieval society. Landed wealth etc. was difficult to transport, whereas money could be transported by a simple algebraic operation on one side or another of the ledger.30 Mumford’s “ledger” took the form of the Bank of England in 1694, and was further accelerated by Thomas Savery’s steam pump in 1698. As a result, “war was endemic, because its main object was to extract wealth from other nations.”31 The machinic and amplifying relations between ever more portable forms of warfare, primitive accumulation, finance, credit to enable investments (before the return on those investments had created new capital), and the demand for security in newly formed settlements created terraforms and institutionalized a new kind of planet—that of the Eurocene.

### FW

#### Suppression DA- Fw works as a suppressive system attempting to destroy non-dominant discourses working within the same axioms of control that the war on security prompts- FW is a violent method of war against the aff

Groves 11, (Jairus Victor Groves, BECOMING WAR: ECOLOGY, ETHICS, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF VIOLENCE, 2011, A dissertation submitted to John Hopkins for a PhD)

The prerequisite for this mobile, emergent, protocol of control is a network architecture that accelerates and facilitates flow or movement; it is etiquette not unlike unconsciously yielding right of way in traffic in the absurd world of automobiles traveling at 70 miles per hour. Whether it is the flow of desire and enjoyment, capital and bodies, or a deluge of information, the axiom of a control society is mobility. To put this in contrast to earlier power dispositifs using the example of controversial or disruptive knowledge, the sovereign or juridical power arrangement is characterized by the censorship of disruptive or undesired knowledge; it invests the discourse of expertise such that alternative knowledges are dismissed as backward or naive. In control systems knowledge is replaced all together with more data than can be metabolized by whatever 39 at a given moment is considered the public sphere. Institutional expertise gives way to impersonal interventions in network flows. Every blogger has a different tidbit of information every news show a new take on the same problem, each allowing the consumer to find the modulation of the story to fit their specific needs whether that be reactionary, 'radical', complacent, angry or seeking grounds for revenge. The control society optimizes rather than either repressing (sovereign/juridical) or managing (specific) bodies. The control system is a difference machine with a refrain or protocol of control

#### Some DA

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Although security is primarily analyzed by Foucault as a series of conducts or discursive practices it is not constructed ex nihilo out of language. Instead security emerges as a problem because of an encounter with a "space in which a series of uncertain elements unfolds...a circular link between effects and causes."224 He calls this alleatory space the milieu. Here I would like to read Foucault as a critic that sees discourse not as the formative or generative site of production but as the element of conductivity through which generation and formation pass. For Foucault language and nonlinguistic discursive practice are joined by many different means. Meaning and power circulate amongst rivers, cities, grain shortages, and disease outbreaks.225 In Foucault's account there is not a strict separation between things and the inter-subjective economies of discourse that make things into meaning but there is a difference of emphasis. I am wary of discourse analysis because it is too readily available to an anthropocentrism enamored with its own facility with words. Foucault reveals that facility to be facile, too easy. The world is neither fully grasped by the subject of enunciation, the speaker of discourse, nor does it exhaust the creative input of things and events exceeding or resisting human signification.226 When asked by Lacan's protege J.A. Miller whether the task of criticism requires the presupposition of an unconscious or at least an individual Foucault responds by saying that there are individuals but also subindividuals all contending with each other in what Foucault calls a "creative...and 997 heterogeneous ensemble." Therefore the speaking of language or the resistance of a particular conduct is not entirely human in the sense of unified or even coordinated. Foucault is not even willing to cede the ground to Jacques Lacan of a governing unconscious to organize the 'ensemble.'

It is crucial in this context that discourse should not be reduced to the semantical field of spoken interaction and written text. Paul Edwards makes clear that "discourse goes beyond speech acts to refer to the entire field of signifying or meaningful practices: these social interactions - material, institutional, and linguistic - through which human knowledge is produced and reproduced. A discourse, then, is a way of knowledge, a background of assumptions and agreements about how reality is to be interpreted and expressed, supported by paradigmatic metaphors, techniques, and technologies and potentially embodied in social institutions."15 In accordance with this broad understanding of discourse as a nexus of ideas and practices which (re)produce social reality and a certain set of power relations with it, modernity is to be viewed in Philip Lawrence's terms as "a structural organisation of state, economy, society and culture; a power complex and a mode of consciousness." 16

## Case neg

#### Scenario planning good

Amer et al 12, (Muhammad Amer, Tugrul U. Daim, Antonie Jetter, “A Review of Scenario Planning”, 2012, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2012.10.003>, vol. 46 of Futures, produced by the dept. of Engineering management at Portland State)

Scenarios are considered a valuable tool that helps organizations to prepare for possible eventualities, and makes them more flexible and more innovative [2]. Scenarios are outline of some aspects of future and generally scenario refers to an outline of the plot of a dramatic work, script of a motion picture or a television program [3]. Herman Kahn is considered one of the founders of futures studies and father of scenario planning, defines scenario in his book as ‘‘a set of hypothetical events set in the future constructed to clarify a possible chain of causal events as well as their decision points’’ [4]. Scenarios are description of a future situation and the course of events which allows one to move forward from the actual to the future situation [5]. Scenarios are also defined as alternative futures resulting from a combination of trends and policies [6]. Scenario planning techniques are frequently used by managers to articulate their mental models about the future in order tomake better decisions [7]. In technology planning, forecasting, strategic analysis, and foresight studies, scenarios are used to incorporate and emphasize those aspects of the world that are important to the forecast. Systematic use of scenarios for clarifying thinking about the future started after the World War II and US Department of Defense used it as a method for military planning in 1950s at RAND Corporation [3,4,8–13]. After that scenario methodology was extensively used for social forecasting, public policy analysis and decision making in 1960s. Scenario building process exerts a strong influence on human thinking, decision-making process and initiate a public debate [14]. Schoemaker describes that scenario planning must outline the possible futures, capture a wide range of options, stimulate thinking about the future and challenge the prevailing mindset and status quo [1,15]. Futures studies help to see the present differently and these are a devise for ‘disturbing the present’ [16]. Therefore, it is importantthat while developing and analyzing scenarios, it should be encouraged to consider options beyond the traditional operational and conceptual comfort zone of the organization [17–19]. This encouragement will help to explore new possibilities and unique insights. Consideration of multiple possible future alternatives helps to conduct future planning in a holistic manner [20,21] and significantly enhance the ability to deal with uncertainty and the usefulness of overall decision making process [9,22]. Scenario planning helps us to be prepared for futures and innovate the futures [2]. Scenario planning is a good way to question the future [23]. Scenarios provide an overall picture of the environment and highlight the interactions among several trends and events in the future [24]. Moreover, scenario planning presents all complex elements together into a coherent, systematic, comprehensive and plausible manner [3]. Scenarios are also very useful for highlighting implications of possible future system discontinues, identifying nature and timings of these implications, and projecting consequences of a particular choice or policy decision [17]. Scenario provides the description of future situation and the development or portrayal of the path that leads us out of today and into the future [25]. Schwab et al. also state that scenario approach involves developing future situations (scenarios) and describing the path from any given present to these future situations [26]. Thus scenario planning process helps to make the desirable future real [27]. Use of scenario planning has increased significantly during the last decade [28]. Research indicates that there is correlation between adoption of scenario planning techniques and uncertainty, unpredictability and instability of the overall business environment [29]. Increasing uncertainty has increased the importance of identifying future trends and expected business landscape. Therefore, utilization of scenario has increased due to greater complexity and uncertainty in the business environment. Researchers have also reported a direct link between scenario planning activities and innovation [30